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The present study compared 5- and 10-year-old North American and Israeli children’s beliefs about the
objectivity of different categories (n = 109). Children saw picture triads composed of two exemplars of the
same category (e.g., two women) and an exemplar of a contrasting category (e.g., a man). Children were
asked whether it would be acceptable or wrong for people in a different country to consider contrasting
exemplars to be the same kind. It was found that children from both countries viewed gender as objectively
correct and occupation as ﬂexible. The ﬁndings regarding race and ethnicity differed in the two countries,
revealing how an essentialist bias interacts with cultural input in directing children’s conceptualization of
social groups.
A growing number of studies reveal that not only
do children manifest intergroup biases from a
young age (Bigler & Liben, 2007; Dunham, Baron,
& Carey 2011; Rutland, Killen, & Abrams 2010), but
moreover their group concepts are couched in
essentialist terms (Gelman, 2003). Speciﬁcally, chil-
dren seem to conceive of certain social categories,
such as race, ethnicity, or gender, as being perma-
nent, biologically determined, inductively powerful,
and as capturing objectively “natural” kinds.
Research on adults has shown both positive correla-
tional and experimental connections between an
essentialist conceptualization of certain social cate-
gories (but not all, see Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst
2002), and negative attitudes toward that category
(see Prentice & Miller, 2007, for a review, and
Keller, 2005; Morton, Postmes, Haslam, & Hornsey
2009; Williams & Eberhardt, 2008, for supporting
evidence). Whereas no direct links between
essentialism and attitudes has yet been shown
among children, the two phenomena show similar
developmental trends. For instance, North American
kindergarteners reveal implicit attitudes regarding
race—conceptualized strictly in terms of Blacks and
Whites (Baron & Banaji, 2006), and they view race
as an inheritable characteristic (Hirschfeld, 1996).
Analogously, Jewish Israeli kindergarteners hold
negative stereotypes regarding Arabs (Bar-Tal &
Teichman, 2005), and they view ethnicity—
conceptualized as Jews and Arabs—as an induc-
tively powerful category, more so than gender,
social status, religiosity, or various personality traits
(Diesendruck & haLevi, 2006).
As hinted earlier, whereas essentialist thinking
about social categories seems to be present in vari-
ous cultures, the particular type of category essen-
tialized varies. For instance, in addition to the
examples earlier regarding race in the United
States and ethnicity in Israel, North American kin-
dergarteners treat gender as biologically, rather
than environmentally, determined (Taylor, Rhodes,
& Gelman 2009), Chilean children view social class
as inductively powerful (del Rio & Strasser, 2011),
and Vezo children in Madagascar conceive of eth-
nicity as inheritable (Astuti, Solomon, & Carey
2004). These ﬁndings of cross-cultural variation
could be taken to present an interesting challenge
to explaining the development of social essentialism.
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On the one hand, if different cultures vary in
terms of which social categories invoke essentialist
beliefs, then we could conclude that cultural input
plays an important role in the developmental pro-
cess. On the other hand, the sheer universality of
social essentialism could be taken to indicate that
cultural input in fact plays a minimal role. Cru-
cially, however, before we can adjudicate between
these possibilities, we need to ascertain that the
cross-cultural variability is not due to simple dif-
ferences in the very categories assessed. To this
end, we need to evaluate essentialist beliefs of chil-
dren from different cultures regarding a variety of
similar categories. That is the main goal of this
study.
To date, relevant studies have compared how
children from different subpopulations within a
country conceptualize the same type of social cate-
gory. For instance, it has been found that in Israel,
already by kindergarten, religious Jewish children
attribute higher inductive potential to ethnicity than
do Muslim Arab or secular Jewish children (Birn-
baum, Deeb, Segall, Ben-Eliyahu, & Diesendruck
2010), North American teenagers from rural homog-
enous communities view race and gender as a natu-
ral category to a greater extent than do children
from urban diverse cities (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009),
and African American kindergarteners view race as
more stable than do European American children
(Kinzler & Dautel, 2012). This study takes a step
further and assesses how children from different
countries view the same social categories and how
this process might change as children become
immersed in their cultures.
The comparison being tested here will provide
clearer conclusions regarding the theoretical posi-
tions on the development of essentialist beliefs,
alluded earlier. Some scholars have suggested that
cultural values and input are crucial for the very
elaboration of essentialist thinking (Fodor, 1998). A
milder role of culture is proposed by others who
argue that although children might have an intui-
tive tendency to essentialize biological kinds, the
generalization of such a tendency toward social
kinds is culturally mediated (Atran, 1995; Gil-
White, 2001). An even more modest—though still
important—role of culture is attributed by those
who claim that although children may be innately
predisposed to divide the social world into essen-
tially distinct kinds, the speciﬁc kinds that end up
being essentialized are deﬁned by cultural input
(Hirschfeld, 1996).
Especially in light of the latter two accounts, a
question arises as to whether there are unique or
necessary features that make particular social cate-
gories optimal candidates for essentialization (see
Kinzler, Shutts, & Correll 2010, for a parallel ques-
tion). For instance, Atran (1995) suggests that
morphological distinctiveness may reinforce the
essentialization of racial categories in the United
States, and Gil-White (2001) argues that the prac-
tice of endogamous weddings and the intergenera-
tional transmission of group membership reinforce
the essentialization of ethnicity in Mongolia. Others
have noted more generally that category types that
either mark coalitional alliances (e.g., those involved
in interethnic conﬂicts) or have evolutionary signiﬁ-
cance (e.g., gender) are primary targets for essential-
ization (Cosmides, Tooby, & Kurzban 2003).
Finally, it has also been suggested that children
might be particularly prone to form conceptually
rich categories of social groups deﬁned by deontic
or role-based properties such as occupational cate-
gories (e.g., doctors), which are deﬁned by expecta-
tions about what category members should do
(Kalish & Lawson, 2008). To adequately address
these possibilities, and more generally address the
universality of the development of essentialism, it is
imperative to: (a) compare children’s concepts of
different types of categories and (b) conduct such a
comparison among children from different cultures.
This study does that.
The study included children from two countries:
the United States and Israel. One of the main rea-
sons for conducting this particular comparison is
that although there are certain similarities between
these countries in general cultural characteristics
(e.g., both are Western countries with diverse pop-
ulations), the two differ in the relative prominence
of certain social categories. In particular, as
reviewed earlier, research in the United States has
shown that the category of race becomes essential-
ized with development (Hirschfeld, 1996; Rhodes
& Gelman, 2009), whereas research in Israel reveals
that ethnicity (i.e., categorization of Jews and
Arabs) possesses that status already by kindergar-
ten age (Birnbaum et al., 2010; Diesendruck &
haLevi, 2006). Importantly, although both these
categories are present in the two countries, they
likely have different meanings associated with
them. For instance, in Israel, race is most salient
with respect to Ethiopian Jews who have immi-
grated to Israel in the past two decades. In other
words, race is subsumed under a culturally very
salient superordinate category—Jews. In contrast,
in the United States, the difference between Jews
and Arabs may be seen not as an ethnic divide
but rather as a difference in religion.
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A further reason to focus on these two categories
is that not only do they differ in their cultural
salience but they also are marked by theoretically
relevant different characteristics. Namely, whereas
racial categories roughly correspond to differences
in intrinsic physical features such as skin color (but
see Hirschfeld, 1996, for limitations of such cues),
ethnic categories are often not visually apparent in
intrinsic features of a person and instead are distin-
guished based on cultural practices, alliances, and
endogamy (Gil-White, 2001). In other words, these
two kinds of categories constitute prime test cases
for addressing some of the positions reviewed
earlier regarding the nature of candidate social
categories for essentialization. Namely, if essential-
ism is invoked by the presence of morphologically
distinct markers, then we might expect children
from both countries to be equally likely to essential-
ize racial categories. In turn, if essentialism is
driven by a need to track cultural-speciﬁc alliances
maintained via endogamy and cultural practices,
then children’s essentialist beliefs will be directed to
the social categories especially salient in their
cultural environments: race in the United States,
ethnicity in Israel. To more exhaustively cover the
various categorical features noted above as poten-
tially prompting essentialist thinking, we also
included categories of gender and occupation. In
particular, gender marks a category with strong
evolutionary signiﬁcance, whereas occupation is
primarily deﬁned by deontic properties.
The task used to assess children’s conceptualiza-
tion of categories was adapted from one previously
employed by Rhodes and Gelman (2009) in their
study of North American children’s concepts of
gender and race. The task assesses to what extent
children view categories as arbitrary and culturally
variable as opposed to objective and universal. In
this task, children were shown triads of pictures
depicting two exemplars of a given category
(e.g., two women), and an exemplar from a contrast-
ing category (e.g., a man). After establishing that
children recognized the two exemplars as being
indeed members of the same category, children were
told about a hypothetical country where people cate-
gorize these same items differently, such that they
consider the two contrasting exemplars (e.g., a man
and a woman) as members of the same category.
The critical question asked children whether such
alternative categorization was acceptable, or was
wrong and thus needed to be corrected. The
rationale is that if children essentialize a given cate-
gory type, then they should believe that there is
only one objective and correct way to categorize. In
other words, they should consider an alternative
categorization of such a category type as “wrong.”
We studied children from two age groups:
5- and 10-year-olds. These ages were chosen because
past research on a number of the social categories
assessed here have shown important developmental
changes between these ages in the degree to which
children essentialize these categories (e.g., see Birn-
baum et al., 2010, on ethnicity; Rhodes & Gelman,
2009, on race; Taylor et al., 2009, on gender). Our
main interest was in uncovering similarities and
differences in North American and Israeli children’s
concepts of the various social categories, and how
these concepts might change with development. Of
special interest were children’s concepts of race and
ethnicity. The hypotheses were that if racial catego-
ries become essentialized in the United States and
ethnic categories in Israel because of their particular
cultural salience, then we should expect children in
the United States to essentialize race more than
children in Israel, and children in Israel to essential-
ize ethnicity more than children in the United
States. Alternatively, if the essentialization of race
and ethnicity derive from their intrinsic characteris-
tics as described earlier, then we should ﬁnd similar
patterns of essentialism regarding these two catego-
ries in both countries.
Method
Participants
A total of 109 children participated in this study:
58 in Israel and 51 in the United States. The Israeli
sample consisted of secular Jewish Hebrew-speaking
children from cities in central Israel. There were
29 kindergarteners (Mage = 5.9 years, range = 5.4–
6.7 years; 13 boys and 16 girls) and 29 ﬁfth graders
(Mage = 10.6 years, range = 9.8–11.6 years; 16 boys
and 13 girls). Israeli children were recruited and
tested in their kindergartens and schools. Represen-
tative of the population of the cities from which the
samples were drawn, all children attending the
kindergartens and schools were Jewish, from vari-
ous cultural backgrounds (e.g., European, North
African, and Middle Eastern descent). The U.S. sam-
ple consisted of English-speaking children from New
York City, recruited and tested in either the Chil-
dren’s Museum of Manhattan or a public elementary
school. Children in the sample came from across
New York City and the sample was approximately
60% European American, 22% Hispanic, 8% African
American, and 10% Asian American. There were 25
kindergarteners (Mage = 5.4 years, range = 4.9–6.0
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years; 13 male, 12 female) and 26 ﬁfth graders
(Mage = 10.5 years, range = 9.0–11.6 years; 13 male,
13 female). Signed parental permission was obtained
for all participants in both countries.
Design
Due to difference in the settings where children
from the two countries were tested, there was a
slight variation in the structure of the testing ses-
sions. In Israel, children were tested in a quiet room
near their classroom, and completed four items for
each of six types of categories (animals, artifacts,
gender, race, ethnicity, and occupation), thus total-
ing 24 items. In the United States, children were
tested in a separate room within a children’s
museum. The room was completely quiet, and was
ﬁtted for the sole purpose of this experiment. More-
over, we coded ofﬂine videos of the children and
would have excluded children who either were too
distracted or were interrupted by noises coming
from outside the room; however, no child needed to
be excluded for these reasons. In any case, to mini-
mize the time we kept children away from the many
museum exhibits, each U.S. child saw only half of
the six category types, thus totaling 12 items per
child. For this purpose, category types were split
into two sets. Each set included one of the nonsocial
types (Set A: animals, Set B: artifacts), one of the
physical-based social category types (Set A: gender,
Set B: race), and one of the symbol- or clothing-
based social category types (Set A: occupation, Set
B: ethnicity). Both 5- and 10-year-olds were ran-
domly assigned to one of the two sets (A or B), and
category types within each set were presented in
counterbalanced orders across children. Children in
both countries were asked the same three questions
about each item in a ﬁxed order: categorization, pos-
sibility, and objectivity (described in Procedure,
below). The nonsocial category types (animals and
artifacts) were included because previous work had
found that 5-year-olds construe animal categories as
more objective than artifact categories (Rhodes &
Gelman, 2009). Thus, we hoped that by including
these two types, we would reinforce in children the
possibility of rating the social categories across a
wide range of objectivity.
Materials
The materials were colored photographs taken
from online open sources, presented via PowerPoint
in laptop computers (see Figure 1 for examples).
The same pictures were used in both locations.
Exemplars for the category race were African
American adults. The category ethnicity was
represented by adults wearing traditional Muslim
Arab and Orthodox Jewish attire (e.g., head shawls
vs. yarmulke and prayer shawl, respectively). The
category occupation was represented via the
uniforms and accessories typically worn by doctors
and police ofﬁcers.
Each category type was represented by four
triads. In each triad, two of the pictures were the
test exemplars, and they represented instances of
two contrasting categories (e.g., a man and a
woman for the category type gender). The third
picture was the target picture, which matched only
one of the two test exemplars (e.g., a different woman).
Race
Ethnicity
Gender
Occupation
Figure 1. Examples of pictures used for the categories of people.
The two left pictures were the test exemplars; the right picture
was the target exemplar. In the presentation to the children, the
target was placed below the test exemplars.
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The target picture always appeared below the test
exemplars, and equidistant from both. The exemplars
on each triad contrasted on only the relevant cate-
gory type, but across triads, there were exemplars
from various types. For instance, for gender, one
triad represented two Black men and a Black
woman, and another represented two Arab women
and an Arab man. In this way, for instance, each
category was not confounded with other categories,
and whereas there were many dimensions by
which the three exemplars in a triad could be
viewed as being similar (e.g., all three were adults),
there was only one salient dimension by which they
could be discriminated. Table 1 lists all categories
and their respective exemplars in each triad.
In addition, two triads were used for practice tri-
als. The ﬁrst triad consisted of a brick and a feather
as test exemplars, and a rock as the target exem-
plar. The second triad consisted of broccoli and
cookies as test exemplars, and chocolate ice cream
as the target exemplar.
Procedure
After a brief introduction, the experimenter sat
the child in front of the laptop computer, and told
the child that she was going to show them some
pictures and ask some questions. She then pro-
ceeded with the two practice trials. The goals of the
practice trials were to: (a) familiarize children with
the questions and (b) illustrate to the child the
range of possible answers to the questions. For
these purposes, the ﬁrst trial asked children to con-
sider the veracity and universality of a physical
law, and the second trial asked about personal taste
preferences.
Practice trials. For the ﬁrst practice trial, the
experimenter pointed to the brick and the feather
and asked the child: “Which of these two things
sinks in the water, like this thing [pointing to the
rock]?” After the child responded, the experimenter
asked the child: “Do you think there might be a
place in the world where people say the opposite?
That is, that instead of saying this thing [the brick]
sinks in the water, they say that this thing [the
feather] sinks in the water?” Finally, the experi-
menter asked the last question: “I know a place in
the world where people do say the opposite from
us. That is, they say that this thing [the feather]
sinks in the water, and not that this thing [the
brick] does. Do you think it is wrong how they do
it, and that we should correct them and teach them
to do it like us? Or is it OK the way they do it, just
different from us?”
The second practice trial was identical, except the
experimenter asked children questions about what
is tasty like chocolate ice cream: broccoli or cookies,
and then asked about the universality of this opin-
ion. On both practice trials, if children answered
incorrectly, they were corrected by the experimenter
so that the full range of possible answers was made
available to them. Speciﬁcally, on the ﬁrst practice
trial, the experimenter noted that it is not possible
for a brick not to sink, and on the second trial, the
experimenter noted that it is quite possible that peo-
ple have different tastes and think that broccoli is
as good as chocolate ice cream. In this manner, the
practice trials exposed children to the possibility
that in some cases, it is appropriate to answer the
experimental questions by saying that one needs to
correct what people somewhere else do because it is
wrong, whereas in other cases is it appropriate to
say that it is OK how others do it even if it is differ-
ent from what the child thinks.
Experimental trials. Upon completion of the prac-
tice trials, the experimenter told children that they
Table 1
List of All Category Types and Category Exemplars Used in the Study
Category
type Test exemplars Target exemplar
Animals 1 Cat, dog
2 Sheep, pig
3 Frog, turtle
4 Lion, Wolf
1 Dog
2 Sheep
3 Frog
4 Lion
Artifacts 1 Spoon, fork
2 Table, bookshelf
3 Saw, hammer
4 Dress, shirt
1 Spoon
2 Table
3 Saw
4 Dress
Gender 1 Arab woman, Arab man
2 Black man, Black woman
3 White man, White womana
4 White man, White woman
1 Arab woman
2 Black man
3 White woman
4 White woman
Race 1 Black woman, White woman
2 Black man, White mana
3 Black woman, White woman
4 Black man, White man
1 Black woman
2 Black man
3 Black woman
4 Black man
Occupation 1 Female doctor, policewomana
2 Male doctor, policeman
3 Female doctor, policewoman
4 Policeman, Male doctor
1 Female doctor
2 Male doctor
3 Female doctor
4 Policeman
Ethnicity 1 Arab woman, Jewish woman
2 Arab man, Jewish man
3 Arab man, Jewish mana
4 Arab man, Jewish man
1 Arab woman
2 Arab man
3 Jewish man
4 Jewish man
aTriad depicted in Figure 1. All pictures depicted different indi-
viduals (e.g., there were four different female doctors).
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were now going to see pictures of things, animals,
and people. The structure of the experimental trials
was very similar to that of the practice trials. The
experimenter presented children each triad of a
given category type and asked them three questions
about it.
The ﬁrst question was the categorization question.
The experimenter pointed to the two test exemplars
(e.g., a man and a woman in a gender triad), and
asked children: “Which of these two is of the same
kind as this one [the test exemplar, another
woman]?” Children received a score of 1 if they
picked the test exemplar from the same category
(e.g., the woman), and 0 if they picked the other
test exemplar (e.g., the man).
Next the experimenter asked children the possibil-
ity question. This question was used exclusively as a
probe to the theoretically central objectivity question.
The possibility question was exactly as the one in
the practice trials, that is, “Do you think there might
be a place in the world where people say the oppo-
site? That is, that instead of saying that these two
people [the two women] are of the same kind, they
say that these two people [the test man and the
target woman] are of the same kind?” Given that
this was intended as a lead-in question and did not
add conceptually to the objectivity question, we did
not analyze children’s responses to it.
Finally, the experimenter asked the objectivity
question: “I know a place in the world where peo-
ple say the opposite from us. That is, instead of
saying that these two people [the two women] are
of the same kind (in Hebrew: “oto sug”), they say
that these two people [the test man and the target
woman] are of the same kind. Do you think it is
wrong how they do it, and that we should correct
them and teach them to do it like us? Or is it OK
the way they do it, just different from us?” Chil-
dren’s responses were scored as 1 if they answered,
“It is wrong,” and 0 if they said, “It is OK.” A high
score on this question meant that children had an
essentialist view regarding the categorization of the
speciﬁc category type, and believed their categori-
zation to be universal, normative, and an objective
reﬂection of reality. For children who answered the
categorization question in an unexpected manner
(e.g., said that a man and a woman are of the same
kind), the experimenter phrased the possibility and
objectivity questions in a manner consistent with
the child’s response (e.g., asked children about a
place where they consider the two women as being
of the same kind). However, as described next in
the Results section, we did not include data from
these trials in the analyses.
Children saw all four triads for each category
type in sequence, and then moved on to another
type. Order of presentation of the category types,
and of the triads within each type, was random-
ized, and counterbalanced across children. Place-
ment of each test exemplar on the participant’s
right or left was counterbalanced for each triad
across participants. Preliminary analyses revealed
no signiﬁcant effects of the categories’ presentation
order, either in Israel (ps > .4) or in the United
States (ps > .3).
Results
Given the differences in design across the two
countries, our ﬁrst analyses were conducted sepa-
rately for each country. In all analyses, because chil-
dren provided a series of binary responses, we
analyzed the data with binomial regression models.
These yield Wald v2 values as indicators of main
effects and interactions. We present all data as
probabilities of a particular response (probability of
categorizing based on the expected criteria; proba-
bility of rejecting the alternate category).
Categorization Question
First, we examined children’s responses to the
categorization question, which asked children to
identify two items that were of the “same kind.” As
shown in Table 2, children of both age groups
and from both countries categorized based on the
expected criteria more often than expected by
chance (50%) for each type of category (ps < .01, on
binomial tests).
Table 2
Probabilities (and Conﬁdence Intervals) of Categorizing Based on the
Expected Criteria (Categorization Question) for Each Category Type
United States Israel
5-year-olds 10-year-olds 5-year-olds 10-year-olds
Animals .92 (.75, .98) .91 (.66, .98) .88 (.81, .93) .98 (.94, 1)
Artifacts .84 (.69, .93) .98 (.86, 1) .95 (.87, .98) .91 (.85, .95)
Gender .80 (.63, .90) .88 (.65, .96) .93 (.87, .97) .94 (.84, .98)
Race .70 (.53, .83) .95 (.75, .99) .83 (.74, .89) .93 (.85, .97)
Occupation .92 (.75, .98) .93 (.63, .99) .93 (.87, .97) .98 (.89, 1)
Ethnicity .86 (.77, .92) .82 (.74, .88) .89 (.81, .94) .99 (.94, 1)
Note. Probabilities are based on a score of 1 if children picked
the test exemplar from the same category, and 0 if they picked
the exemplar from the other category.
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United States. There were no signiﬁcant main
effects or interaction of age and category type
among children in the United States.
Israel. There were a number of signiﬁcant
effects among children in Israel. First, there was a
signiﬁcant effect of age, Wald v2(1) = 8.19,
p = .004, such that older children (M = .97,
CI = .94, .98) categorized more accurately than
younger children (M = .91, CI = .87, .94). Second,
there was a signiﬁcant effect of category type,
Wald v2(5) = 14.57, p = .01, such that children
categorized less accurately for race than for ani-
mals, occupation, or ethnicity, ps < .05. Finally,
there was also an interaction between age and
category type, Wald v2(5) = 15.69, p = .008. At
age 5, children were less accurate for race than
for gender, occupation, or artifacts, ps < .05. At
age 10, children were less accurate for artifacts
than for animals, occupation, or ethnicity, ps
< .05, and less accurate for race than for occupa-
tion, p < .05.
However, despite these variations, children from
both countries were accurate on the majority of tri-
als across all category types—responding correctly
on over 70% of trials—indicating that the categories
were highly familiar to children.
Objectivity Question
Our key question of interest was whether chil-
dren would accept that alternate ways of categoriz-
ing could be correct. Rejecting these alternate
categories as “wrong” indicates the belief that
categories reﬂect an objectively accurate way of
categorizing—an essentialist belief. To analyze this
question, we calculated the proportion of trials in
which children said it was wrong to categorize
items differently, out of those trials in which they
answered the categorization question in the
expected manner (e.g., trials in which children said
the two women were of the same kind, and then
said that it would be wrong for other people to
consider a man and a woman as being of the same
kind).
United States. In the United States, there was a
main effect of category type, Wald v2(5) = 21.10,
p = .001, but no main or interactive effects of age.
As can be seen in Figure 2, children rejected the
categories for animals more than for occupation,
p = .007, or race, p = .05; they rejected the catego-
ries for gender more than for occupation, p = .008,
or race, p = .05; and they rejected the categories for
ethnicity more than for artifacts, p = .05, or race,
p = .001.
Israel. In Israel too there was a main effect of
category type, Wald v2(5) = 17.29, p = .004, but no
main or interactive effects of age. As can be seen in
Figure 3, Israeli children rejected alternative catego-
rization of ethnicity more than of any other cate-
gory type, ps < .05, and they rejected the categories
of gender more than race, p = .02.
Comparison across countries. Given the theoretical
importance of the question of how essentialist
beliefs about social categories vary across cultures
and development, we next tested the effects of
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Figure 2. U.S. children’s responses on the objectivity question.
Error bars represent standard errors. Brackets represent signiﬁ-
cant differences between connected categories.
Figure 3. Israeli children’s responses on the objectivity question.
Error bars represent standard errors. Brackets represent signiﬁ-
cant differences between connected categories.
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age and country on children’s objectivity beliefs
about each type of social category (see means in
Table 3).
For gender and occupation, there were no main
or interactive effects of age or country. For race, the
main effects were not signiﬁcant; however, there
was a signiﬁcant Age 9 Country interaction, Wald
v2(1) = 5.62, p = .02. As can be seen in Figure 4, the
direction of developmental change in essentialist
beliefs toward race was in opposite directions in
the two countries—increasing in the United States
and decreasing in Israel—although the age differ-
ence reached signiﬁcance only in the Israeli sample
(p = .02 and p = .13, for Israel and the United
States, respectively). For ethnicity, again the main
effects were not signiﬁcant; however, the Age
9 Country interaction was marginal, Wald
v2(1) = 3.03, p = .08. Essentialist beliefs about
ethnicity increased in the United States, p = .03, but
did not change across age in Israel, remaining high
in the two age groups (see Figure 5).
Discussion
The goal of this study was to evaluate to what
extent children from two different countries—United
States and Israel—hold similar or different beliefs
about the objectivity of various types of social cate-
gories. In particular, we were interested in assessing
the role of various factors as contributors to the
likelihood of children essentializing a given social
category. To this end, we investigated 5- and
10-year-olds’ beliefs about four types of social
categories: an evolutionarily primary category
type—gender; a familiar deontic category type—
occupation; a physically marked and salient
category type in the United States—race; and a
symbolically marked and salient category type in
Israel—ethnicity. The results of the study revealed
both similarities and differences in children’s
thinking across cultural contexts.
Regarding the similarities, we found that chil-
dren in both countries tended to view gender in
essentialist terms, but less so occupation. North
American children across ages rejected an alternate
categorization of gender more strongly than they
did alternate categorizations of either race or occu-
pation, and Israeli children rejected an alternate
categorization of gender more rigorously than an
alternate categorization of race. Thus, for children,
Table 3
Probabilities (and Conﬁdence Intervals) of Rejecting Alternate Catego-
ries (Objectivity Question) for the Social Categories
United States Israel
5-year-olds 10-year-olds 5-year-olds 10-year-olds
Gender .61 (.39, .80) .63 (.43, .80) .70 (.55, .82) .66 (.51, .78)
Race .25 (.09, .53) .53 (.27, .78) .69 (.53, .81) .43 (.28, .60)
Occupation .37 (.17, .63) .52 (.30, .73) .70 (.54, .82) .59 (.42, .74)
Ethnicity .45 (.22, .71) .78 (.54, .92) .76 (.59, .88) .77 (.60, .88)
Note. Probabilities are based on a score of 1 if children answered,
“It is wrong,” and 0 if they said, “It is OK.”
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Figure 4. Comparison of U.S. and Israeli children’s responses to
race on the objectivity question, across ages. Error bars represent
standard errors.
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Figure 5. Comparison of U.S. and Israeli children’s responses to
ethnicity on the objectivity question, across ages. Error bars rep-
resent standard errors.
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men and women are objectively distinct kinds of
people, and anyone who says otherwise should be
corrected.
The relatively high essentialization of gender is
consistent with previous ﬁndings that children view
gender as biologically rather than environmentally
determined (Taylor et al., 2009). Moreover, it sup-
ports the claim that categories with arguably high
evolutionary functionality are primary candidates
for essentialism (Cosmides et al., 2003). In turn, the
relatively low essentialization of occupation sug-
gests that role-based deontic categories might not
be primary candidates for essentialism. An implica-
tion of this ﬁnding is that whereas children might
be prone to infer deontic properties given a novel
social category—as found by Kalish and Lawson
(2008)—the reverse might not be true—that is,
being deﬁned by deontic properties is not sufﬁcient
in order for a familiar social category to be essen-
tialized by children.
The similarities in the North American and
Israeli children’s conceptualization of gender and
occupation were also important for methodological
reasons. They indicate that despite differences
between the two countries in the samples, testing
situations, etc., the crucial objectivity question was
interpreted in similar ways across countries. Conse-
quently, differences found in children’s responses to
the objectivity responses could more conﬁdently be
interpreted as indicative of reliable cultural differ-
ences. Differences across countries were manifested
primarily in children’s beliefs about race and eth-
nicity. These differences were evident in both the
degree of essentialism of these category types com-
pared to other types, and in developmental changes
in how they were construed.
Regarding race, two main patterns emerged.
First, overall, children from both countries did not
hold a highly essentialistic view of race. In particu-
lar, in both countries children were more willing to
accept alternate categorizations of race than of eth-
nicity and gender. Second, we found opposite
developmental trends in the two countries. Namely,
whereas in Israel race became signiﬁcantly less
essentialized with age, in the United States the
reverse trend was the case.
In his pioneering work on race, Hirschfeld (1996)
concluded that United States and French kindergar-
teners already hold an essentialist conception of
race. This was evident in switched-at-birth tasks, as
well as tasks in which children had to decide on
the heritability or stability of racial categories when
contrasted with other categories. The present ﬁnd-
ings with kindergarteners would seem to contradict
Hirschfeld’s conclusion. A possible reconciliation is
that although young children may hold a biological
view of category transmission—as assessed in
Hirschfeld’s tasks—they nonetheless do not regard
racial categories as objectively correct—as assessed
here. This explanation is consistent with the notion
that young children’s essentialist beliefs about
human categories are not coherent (Gelman, Hey-
man, & Legare 2007).
The overall developmental pattern found here
with regard to race is suggestive of the importance
of cultural input in the formation of children’s
beliefs. Namely, it seems that although children
may not have an intuitive tendency to essentialize
racial categories, given the “right” kind of input
they learn to do so (see Cosmides et al., 2003, for a
compatible conclusion). Thus, whereas North Amer-
ican children might be exposed to input encourag-
ing the essentialization of race, Israeli children are
not. Consistent with this interpretation are ﬁndings
that North American children’s tendency to treat
race as a natural category (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009)
and as stable through development (Kinzler & Dau-
tel, 2012) increases from ages 5 to 10 years. More-
over, these developmental patterns vary across
subgroups within the United States. For instance,
teenagers from rural and relatively homogenous
communities are more prone to embrace an essen-
tialist conception of race than teenagers from
diverse cities (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009), and African
American children give more weight to race in
determining the identity of an individual than do
European American children (Kinzler & Dautel,
2012). Thus, although indirect, these latter ﬁndings
intimate that the kinds of exposure children experi-
ence affect their concepts of racial categories. Taken
together, the ﬁnding that racial categories were
taken by children in both countries to be less
objective than other social categories (e.g., gender
or ethnicity), and the developmental increase in the
objectivity of racial categories, intimate that these
categories are not a priori prime candidates for
essentialization.
The ﬁndings regarding ethnicity complement
those on race. Here, we found that whereas the
tendency of North American children to view eth-
nicity as objectively correct increased with age,
Israeli children held this view already by kindergar-
ten, with no changes through development. In fact,
across ages, Israeli children rejected more strongly
alternate categorizations of ethnicity than of any
other category. For them, Jews and Arabs are objec-
tively not the same kind, and those who think
otherwise should be corrected.
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This high essentialist status of ethnicity among
Israeli children is consistent with other studies that
assessed different components of essentialist think-
ing. For instance, already by kindergarten, Jewish
Israeli children view ethnicity as more inductively
powerful (i.e., as allowing more inferences based on
an individual’s category membership) than other
social or personality categories (Birnbaum et al.,
2010; Diesendruck & haLevi, 2006), and as stable
and biologically determined (Deeb, Segall, Birn-
baum, Ben-Eliyahu, & Diesendruck 2011). Impor-
tantly, these and other studies report that although
the tendency to essentialize ethnicity emerges quite
early in Israeli children, it is nonetheless affected by
cultural background and input. For instance, reli-
gious Jewish 5- and 6-year-olds are more likely to
essentialize ethnicity than their secular age mates
(Birnbaum et al., 2010; Diesendruck & Haber, 2009),
and secular Jewish second graders attending Jewish–
Arab integrated schools are less likely to essentialize
ethnicity than their age mates attending Jewish-only
schools (Deeb et al., 2011).
These ﬁndings suggest that the main difference
found in this study between the essentialist status
of ethnicity among Israeli children—high already in
kindergarten—and that of race among North Amer-
ican children—low in kindergarten—has to do with
how early the cultural input penetrates children’s
conceptualization of the relevant social groups. This
pattern could be due to the intense interethnic con-
ﬂict in Israel—and the comparably much less
fervent interracial divide in New York—that makes
the respective categories substantially different in
their cultural salience and meaning. In particular,
the sheer awareness of an antagonism between the
ethnic groups might prompt Israeli children’s essen-
tialization of the groups (Cosmides et al., 2003;
Rhodes & Brickman, 2011). A further possibility is
that children in Israel are exposed earlier to cultural
input endorsing essentialist beliefs about ethnicity,
compared to U.S. children’s exposure to input
about racial categories. One kind of input that has
been found to endorse essentialism about social
categories is certain linguistic constructions, such as
generics or labels (e.g., Gelman, Taylor, & Nguyen,
2004; Rhodes, Leslie, & Tworek, 2012). Recent ﬁnd-
ings indeed revealed a positive correlation between
Israeli parents’ use of generics (e.g., “Arabs are like
this”) and category labels when referring to Jewish
and Arab characters in a story book, and their 5-
year-olds’ essentialist beliefs about ethnicity (Segall
& Diesendruck, 2011). A similar study evaluating
North American parents’ linguistic input to their
children about race would provide valuable data to
more directly assess the possibility raised here
about cross-cultural differences in input.
An unexpected ﬁnding was that North American
children regarded ethnicity as more objectively cor-
rect than race, with the signiﬁcance of ethnicity
increasing with age. One could have predicted that
given the higher cultural relevance of race in the
United States, compared to ethnicity, that the for-
mer would be more essentialized than the latter.
There are a few speculative explanations of this
ﬁnding. First, as noted earlier, it is possible that
children in New York regarded Jews and Arabs not
so much as different ethnic groups, but rather as
groups engaged in different religious and cultural
practices. In fact, kindergarteners treat beliefs as
deﬁning properties of novel social categories (Die-
sendruck & Eldror, 2011). A second possible inter-
pretation is that perhaps in other assessments of
essentialism, the expected prominence of race over
ethnicity would be evident. In particular, recent
studies suggest that cultural learning likely inﬂu-
ences the relative standing of categories vis-a-vis
each other (Diesendruck, Birnbaum, Deeb, & Segall
in press). That is, had we directly asked North
American children to determine whether racial or
ethnic categories are more objectively correct, per-
haps they would have responded differently from
the way they responded here, where they were
asked about each category in isolation. Finally, it is
important to acknowledge that there might be
pockets of populations in the New York City area
in which children might indeed view the difference
between Jews and Arabs in much the same way as
Israelis do, that is, as an ethnic divide. These are
potential limitations of this study that could be
amended in future work. Importantly, these poten-
tial methodological shortcomings notwithstanding,
this study still revealed meaningful cross-cultural
differences in how children in Israel and New York
conceptualized racial and ethnic categories. Based
on the ﬁndings by Rhodes and Gelman (2009) and
Diesendruck et al. (in press), it is reasonable to
assume that had we sampled children from more
“typical” North American communities, or had we
used relative measures of essentialism, then the
differences between the two countries would be
even more substantial.
In conclusion, the ﬁndings from this cross-
cultural developmental study on children’s beliefs
about the objectivity of various social categories
provide novel information on the factors contribut-
ing to the essentialization of social categories. In a
nutshell, gender was viewed by children from two
different countries and ages as objectively correct,
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perhaps attesting to its evolutionary primacy. Occu-
pation, in turn, was viewed more ﬂexibly by chil-
dren from both countries and across development,
intimating that neither its deﬁnitional features
(i.e., role-based properties) nor cultural factors sig-
niﬁcantly enhance its essentialist status. Finally, the
results suggest that race and ethnicity become
targets of essentialism, not strictly due to some a
priori intrinsic properties they might contain, but
rather due to their particular cultural signiﬁcance.
A further potential contribution of this conclusion is
more practical in nature. Namely, given the consid-
erable evidence linking essentialist beliefs to inter-
group attitudes in adults, it would be valuable to
track this relation from earlier on in development.
As a ﬁrst step, this could be done by examining
correlations between children’s essentialist beliefs
and their implicit or explicit attitudes toward target
social categories. If such relations were to be found,
then elucidating the role of cultural forces in shap-
ing children’s essentialist beliefs about social catego-
ries may prove helpful in taming the development
of negative and prejudicial intergroup attitudes.
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